THERE is substantive evidence to suggest that Jamaatud Dawa
(JuD) is gaining ground in Pakistan. Irrespective of the causes, the
rise of the group from within a relatively smaller religious sect and
its ability to create an immense impact both on public and policy
discourse in Pakistan is considered by its associates as a great
‘triumph’.
Having conceived its objectives in a narrow sectarian and
anti-democratic perspective, the JuD is now struggling to adjust itself
as an important player in the country’s religious-political landscape.
During the last one decade or so, it has launched and led many mass
movements: a campaign against the Prophet’s (PBUH) images by a Danish
cartoonist; countrywide protests against the Iraq war; Tehrik
Hurmat-i-Rasool (in reaction to the desecration of the Quran in
Guantanamo some years ago); a movement against the women’s protection
bill; and the pro-Saudi Arabia campaign in the context of Riyadh’s role
following the unrest in Bahrain. The group is now among the leading
members of the Difaa-i-Pakistan Council (DPC).
Once the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had the ability to mobilise the immense
mass movements and its participation in any religious and political
agitation was considered the key to success but now the JuD has taken
over the role. One reason could be that the JuD has built its
organisational structure on the pattern of the JI. Also, the top
leadership of the group has served in the JI. Is it a sign of
transformation of a hard-core militant organisation into a mainstream
religious political party? Is the JuD following a pattern similar to
that of Hezbollah and Hamas?
It can be discerned from the recent history of radical and militant
organisations that when the infrastructure of one among such
organisations expanded on a large scale, the group’s stakes grew in the
same system it had been opposing previously.
Contrary to this, militant groups that failed to develop their
organisational infrastructure were subjected to divisions and became
more violent. The JuD has succeeded over time in diversifying its
infrastructure and resources, employing the strategy of social delivery
programmes and exploiting contemporary religious and political issues.
At the same time, despite internal and external pressures, it has
succeeded in keeping its militant network the Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT)
intact. Many militant groups in Pakistan, contemporaries of the JuD,
could not diversify their ideological and physical resources and
ultimately faced erosion within their organisational structures. Their
breakaway factions got involved in terrorism inside the country, which
forced them to limit their links with them and remain underground.
Nevertheless, the JuD is on the surface and owns a solid and
stretched-out infrastructure inside Pakistan which includes more than
300 offices, mosques and madressahs. The group has set up many
commercial ventures including more than 400 English-medium schools,
colleges, transportation companies, residential projects and media
groups and has acquired farmland on a large scale.
Its charity wing has one of the biggest fleet of ambulances in the country, seven hospitals and more than 200 health centres.
The group has the second largest charity network in Pakistan after
Maymar Trust, formally known as Al-Rashid Trust. This means that the JuD
cannot afford any confrontation with the state that could force it to
abandon its activities in the country.
In the beginning, the JuD’s ideological discourse was built on an
extremely narrow sectarian agenda of spreading hatred against the Shia
and Barelvi communities, as reflected in its earlier publications. But
after 9/11, it adopted a reconciliatory approach and invited opposing
sects to its platform to ‘wage a joint struggle for a common cause’.
The approach worked and not only the JuD but the Ahle Hadith school
of thought too gained ground in public and religious discourses. The JuD
even struck roots in the Hindu-dominated districts of Sindh, where more
numbers among the local population were seen to embrace Islam.
It must be a good feeling among JuD’s brothers in Saudi Arabia and
other Gulf states that the militant group has had a significant impact
on Pakistan where these countries had been spending enormous resources
on promoting their orthodox school of thought for decades, but had
failed to attract the Sunni majority.Is JuD’s active participation in
political rallies and membership of an alliance of political parties and
individuals a sign that the group has ambitions to move towards
electoral politics? Though their rejection of democracy was one of the
prime objectives behind the establishment of the JuD, the group
leadership appears to have changed tack.
It seems that the group has the willingness to participate in
electoral politics but is concerned about the absence of an electoral
support base. Nevertheless, JuD members had contested local bodies
elections in their individual capacity and supported different
candidates in previous general elections. The JuD’s taking part in
electoral politics would be an interesting phenomenon for political
scientists to see how a militant group had completed its lifecycle in
Pakistan.
The JuD still believes in achieving its goal through the use of
violence but it is becoming extremely cautious in its sociopolitical
rhetoric. Although it has not yet abandoned ties with Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) it avoids admitting its links with it at a public level.
It may not be because of any fear of public reaction but mainly to
avoid external pressure. There is a dissident voice also in the
organisation that this indifferent policy towards LeT could lead towards
complete detachment from it.
The assessment of JuD’s probable political transformation is only
relevant if the group is considered as an independent entity with no
links to and patronisation from any quarter of the establishment.
Certainly, establishments use non-state actors for their legitimate
and illegitimate purposes, but non-state actors gradually become
independent and it becomes difficult for the establishments to control
them as it happened in the case of many militant organisations in
Pakistan which were created in Afghanistan and Kashmir but later turned
against the state.
For instance, Ilyas Kashmiri, once an asset, rebelled and dealt a
blow to the security forces. He was considered the mastermind behind
some major attacks on security forces in Pakistan.
